We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e, the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups.
Introduction
In 1787, when the founding fathers met in Philadelphia to discuss the creation of a new constitution, the most contentious issue revolved around the composition of the future legislature.
The issue was resolved by the so-called Connecticut Compromise, and the creation of a bicameral legislature, under which states received a weight proportional to their population in the lower house (House of Representatives), but an equal weight in the upper house (Senate).
The resulting distribution of seats in the Electoral College 1 appears as a compromise between the principle of "one man, one vote", leading to efficient and democratic decision-making, and the principle of "one state, one vote", ensuring the voluntary participation of all states.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , this distribution is such that the number of electors per capita in each state decreases with the state's population. In this article, we show why it may actually be optimal to assign weights in such a distorted manner when accounting for participation constraints. The tension between the efficiency of a multi-party institution and its acceptability by all parties is not limited to the episode of the Constitutional Convention. In fact, such a tension is also inherently present for many intergovernmental organizations and confederations, when a group of sovereign states voluntarily commits to collectively decide on one or several policy areas. One prominent example is the Council of the European Union (EU), one of the EU's main decision-making bodies, whose decision rule has often been changed after fierce debates.
The Treaty of Lisbon established the latest rule: a reform is adopted if it is approved by at least 55% of the Member States representing at least 65% of the EU population. 2 This rule again exhibits a compromise between proportionality and equality, which ensures its acceptability by the smallest Member States. Another important example is the UN Security Council, in which the five permanent members can veto any resolution and consequently benefit from a disproportionate power. When the Charter of the UN was ratified in San Francisco in 1945, "the issue was made crystal clear by the leaders of the Big Five: it was either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at all" (Wilcox, 1945) . In that case, the acceptability of the rule entailed not only overweighting some countries, but ensuring them veto power.
The goal of this article is to study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. Should groups be weighted according to their populations, or should small groups be overweighted? Should some important groups benefit from veto power? To address these questions, we take a second-best approach to institutional design by looking for normatively appealing rules among those that are politically feasible.
Our model features a fixed set of countries choosing whether to delegate some of their competences to a supranational entity. 3 The choice to transfer a competence is made unanimously ex ante, before countries learn about their preferences over future decisions. 4 If cooperation is agreed upon, decisions are made collectively according to a predetermined voting rule. If cooperation is rejected, countries remain sovereign and make their own decisions.
Our core assumption is that the choice to delegate reflects a trade-off between the efficiency gains from cooperation and a reduced control over decisions. Making collective decisions is profitable for many reasons: it generates coordination externalities (Loeper, 2011) , allows for economies of scale (Alesina et al., 2005) , increases bargaining power (Moravcsik, 1998) , 2 The rule applies for most policy areas. Additionally, a proposal cannot be blocked by less than four Member States.
3 For instance, the European Union has exclusive competence over customs unions, competition policy, monetary policy (for countries in the Eurozone), common fisheries policy, and common commercial policy. The EU also holds shared competence (Member States cannot exercise competence in areas where the EU has done so) over various other domains, such as the internal market, agricultural policy, environmental policy, and consumer protection. See Treaty of Lisbon (2007b) . 4 The fact that all EU competences must be voluntarily transferred by its Member States is known as the principle of conferral (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007a) . strengthens commitment (Bown, 2004) , etc. However, by forfeiting the right to make their own decisions, countries also lose some decision power. As a result, countries may reject cooperation if they expect to disagree too frequently with the collective decision. The voting rule, which determines how much influence each country exerts on the collective decision, thus plays a critical role in generating cooperation.
We consider in turn the cases of enforceable and non-enforceable collective decisions. When decisions are enforceable, countries commit to accepting the outcome of these decisions even if they end up disagreeing. In the model, countries enter a decision game in which they first choose whether to cooperate or to remain sovereign, and then, in case of cooperation, make a collective binary decision (i.e., to approve or reject a proposed reform). Crucially, countries must decide whether to cooperate before learning their preferences about the reform. We show that under enforceable decisions cooperation can be established (at equilibrium) if the voting rule satisfies a set of participation constraints. This leads us to study a constrained optimization problem: determining which rule delivers the highest (ex ante, utilitarian) welfare, subject to the participation constraint of all countries. Our first result asserts that the optimal rule is a weighted majority rule, whereby each country is assigned a fixed voting weight and a reform is adopted if the total weight of favorable countries exceeds a certain threshold. Furthermore, we show that the weight of a country is equal to its stake in the collective decision unless its participation constraint is binding, in which case it is larger. This result thus offers a justification for overweighting countries that have the lowest (endogenous) incentive to participate.
If collective decisions cannot be enforced, as is often the case in intergovernmental organizations (Maggi and Morelli, 2006) , countries may decide not to comply with collective decisions ex post. In that case, looking at the previous one-shot game is not sufficient, since countries have no incentive to abide by collective decisions if the game ends right away. We thus consider the infinitely repeated version of the previous game where countries decide at each stage whether to cooperate and, in case of cooperation, whether to implement the collective decision. We say that self-enforcing cooperation is achieved if countries choose to cooperate at each stage and always comply with collective decisions on the equilibrium path.
We show that a rule is self-enforcing if it satisfies a set of endogenous constraints: countries with veto power must satisfy their participation constraint, while countries without veto power must satisfy a more stringent "compliance" constraint. Building on this result, we show that optimal self-enforcing rules take the form of weighted majority rules. Countries for which the compliance constraint is not satisfied are strictly overweighted (relative to their stakes) and have veto power. Countries for which the compliance constraint is binding are weakly overweighted. Finally, countries for which the compliance constraint is satisfied but 4 not binding are not overweighted and do not have veto power. The result thus provides a rationale for the use of veto power. Compliance can sometimes be best achieved by giving some "negative power" to a country (i.e., veto power) rather than by compensating it with too much additional "positive power" (i.e., overly large weight).
Finally, we consider a simpler model in which utilities are binary and countries differ only in their population size, but are otherwise (ex ante) identical. This model allows us to address the classic problem of apportionment: how should countries' populations be translated into voting weights of representatives in an international committee? We obtain sharper results in that model. Countries must receive weights proportional to their populations, except for the smallest ones, which must all be weighted equally. The result thus offers a rationale for a minimum representation of smaller countries, as required explicitly in the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007a) . It also echoes the distribution of weights in the U.S.
Electoral College, where each state is allocated a baseline of two seats plus a number of seats proportional to its population. Then, we investigate the implication of self-enforceability in this simplified model and show that it never leads to recommending veto power for a subset of countries: either the rule must be a weighted majority rule with no veto or it must be the unanimity rule. We further show that the former case prevails when the efficiency gain is high and/or the discount factor is high. We also establish that, in that case, the minimum representation threshold decreases with the efficiency gain and the discount factor.
Related Literature
Our article combines both a normative and a positive approach to voting rules in representative committees. On the normative side, we follow the literature on apportionment, which studies the allocation of weights to nations (states) of different sizes in international unions (federations). A first branch of the literature focuses on how to best approximate proportionality when weights are constrained to be integers, such as for the allocation of seats in a parliament (Balinski and Young, 1982) . A second branch of the literature questions the desirability of proportionality, arguing instead in favor of a principle of degressive proportionality, which requires weights to increase less than proportionally to states' populations.
5 Our 5 The literature on degressive proportionality has focused in particular on the square-root law, which recommends weights that are proportional to the square-root of each state's population. Arguments in favor of the square-root law are developed by Penrose (1946), Felsenthal and Machover (1999) , and Barberà and Jackson (2006) , on the grounds of (respectively) equalizing each citizen's influence, minimizing the mean majority deficit (extent of disagreement with the federation-wise majority rule), and following the utilitarian principle. These works are extended by Beisbart and Bovens (2007) and Kurz et al. (2017) , who show the fragility of the law to the introduction of a small degree of correlation in citizen's preferences. Finally, Koriyama et al. (2013) offer a different rationale for degressive proportionality based on the utilitarian principle when citizens exhibit decreasing marginal utility. See Laslier (2012) for a survey.
article follows this second strand, building in particular on the utilitarian approach 6 proposed by Barberà and Jackson (2006) to study voting rules in two-tier democracies, where citizens elect representatives that vote on their behalf. They show in a general framework that an efficient voting rule must weight each state proportionally to its stake in the collective decisions.
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Depending on the assumption made on the correlation of preferences within states, the stake of a state coincides either with its population or with the square root of its population.
We depart from this literature by adding political feasibility constraints. The premise is that countries' decision to cooperate is voluntary. Starting with the same assumption, but inspired by the formation of monetary unions, Casella (1992) shows that a two-country partnership may require overweighting (in the welfare function of the partnership's decisionmaker) the country most tempted to remain sovereign. Our first result on enforceable decisions generalizes her argument to committees with more than two countries by analyzing this tradeoff in a voting game. Barberà and Jackson (2004) also follow a positive approach to the design of voting rules, but their focus is on the stability of the voting rule with respect to a constitutional change: a voting rule is self-stable if it cannot be overthrown by another voting rule. In contrast, we study the stability of a rule with respect to the composition of the union and require that a rule induces the cooperation of all of its members. Note that the optimal rules and optimal self-enforcing rules that we identify are self-stable 8 among those satisfying the same feasibility constraints, since they are obtained from a welfare-maximization program. The assumption of enforceable decisions is relaxed in a pioneering article by Maggi and Morelli (2006) , who consider a union of homogeneous countries engaging in repeated collective decisions. They prove that the optimal self-enforcing rule is either the (efficient) qualified majority rule or the unanimity rule. Our section on self-enforcing voting rules extends their analysis to the case of a heterogeneous union. In particular, we show that the optimal self-enforcing rule may give veto power to a strict subset of countries. In the apportionment model, veto power is given to all countries or none, but the optimal selfenforcing rule may be neither the (efficient) qualified majority rule nor the unanimity rule,
for intermediate values of the discount factor.
Finally, a central assumption in our article is that a country's decision to cooperate results from a trade-off between the efficiency of collective decisions and the loss of power in the union. Following the seminal article of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) on the (endogenous) size of nations, several articles have explored this rationale for cooperation between countries.
6 The ex-ante utilitarian approach to binary voting rules was initiated by Rae (1969) to provide an argument for the majority rule.
7 A similar result is provided by Azrieli and Kim (2014) in a mechanism design context. See also Brighouse and Fleurbaey (2010) for a discussion of this idea at the level of political philosophy.
8 With respect to the unanimity rule, taken as the benchmark constitutional rule.
6 Alesina et al. (2005) study the composition and size of international unions when efficiency gains stem from externalities in public good provisions. Renou (2011) studies the effect of the stringency of the supermajority rule on the endogenous composition of the union. Similar to Renou (2011) , our article emphasizes the importance of the voting rule on the stability of the union, but differs in that we take into account the heterogeneity of countries. Finally, let us note that some authors have provided other rationales for international cooperation, such as information aggregation (Penn, 2016) , or even pure preference aggregation (Crémer and Palfrey, 1996) .
Example
Consider a union of five countries which must decide, repeatedly, whether to impose embargoes on tax havens. A sanction is only effective if implemented by all countries. Countries are uncertain about whether to support the embargoes. Country 1 is generally unfavorable and has a probability 1/3 of supporting a sanction, while countries 2 to 5 are generally favorable and have a probability 2/3 of supporting the sanctions. Preferences are independent across countries and across decisions. In contrast, under cooperation, the embargo may be implemented effectively even if some countries are unfavorable since they must all accept the collective decision. Ex ante, the utility of each country depends both on the preferences of other countries and on the decision rule used to make the collective decision after preferences have realized.
Because all countries have the same stake in the collective decision, the efficient voting rule consists in adopting the embargo by simple majority (Theorem 1). 10 Ex ante, countries 2 to 5 get a utility of:
and are thus much better off than under sovereignty. In contrast, country 1, which tends to disagree with the four other countries, is now much worse off: , where w e = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and t e = 6/15. When two countries are favorable to the embargo, there is a tie, and it is easy to see that the tie-breaking rule can be chosen arbitrarily (see, for instance, the proof of Theorem 1 in Barberà and Jackson (2006) ). Therefore, the simple majority rule is efficient (ties are resolved by blocking a proposal supported by only two countries).
11 All optimal rules and optimal self-enforcing rules mentioned in the article have been checked by an algorithm. When the union is divided in two groups of identical countries, the algorithm finds an optimal (resp. optimal self-enforcing) rule among rules that are symmetric within groups. This is without loss of generality, by linearity of the problem. The algorithm is available upon request.
12 According to Theorem 2, the optimal rule is represented by [w * ; t * ] with t * = 10/21. We note that the rule is equally well represented by [w * ; 1/2].
game ends right away. We thus consider the infinitely repeated version of that game, where countries decide at each stage whether to cooperate and, in case of cooperation, whether to implement the collective decision. Let δ = 5/6 be the common discount factor. In order for the voting rule to be self-enforcing (i.e., induce cooperation and compliance on the equilibrium path), the benefit of not implementing the embargo for unfavorable countries must be outweighed by the long-term cost of not sustaining cooperation. The associated compliance constraints turn out to be more stringent than the participation constraints (Proposition 2).
As a result, the previous optimal rule cannot be self-enforcing since country 1's participation constraint is already binding. Here, self-enforcement can only be achieved by granting veto power to country 1 (Theorem 3). The optimal self-enforcing voting rule is such that the embargo is adopted if and only if country 1 and at least two other countries are in favor. This voting rule can be represented as a weighted majority rule with weights w * * = (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) and threshold t * * = 2/3. Country 1 gets a utility of U * * 
Outline
Section 2 introduces the model and the decision game. Section 3 derives the optimal voting rule when collective decisions are enforceable. Section 4 introduces an infinitely repeated version of the decision game and derives the optimal self-enforcing rule. Then the model is applied in Section 5 to a simple environment in which utilities are binary and countries differ only in their populations. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are gathered in Section 7.
Model
An international union N is made of n countries. Each country has a representative who takes decisions on behalf of its citizens. Representatives must decide whether to remain sovereign or to cooperate, and in the latter case, whether to implement a reform or to stick with the status quo. This is modeled as a game with four stages.
The Decision Game
In the first stage, each country i ∈ N decides to remain sovereign, d i = 0, or to cooperate,
If at least one country wants to remain sovereign, cooperation is aborted (the game ends), and each country i derives a stand-alone utility U ∅ i ∈ R. If all countries decide to cooperate, the game continues, and countries have to make a collective decision on the adoption of a proposed reform.
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In the second stage, countries learn the realization of their preferences for the proposed reform. A vector of utilities u = (u i ) i∈N is drawn from a distribution µ. The number u i measures country i's aggregate utility if the reform is adopted by all countries. The utilities are drawn independently across countries, 14 and such that for all
Each country i privately observes its own utility u i , and the prior µ is common knowledge. If the reform is not adopted by all countries, each country derives a utility of 0.
The third stage is a voting stage. Each country reports a message m i ∈ {0, 1}, where m i = 1 is interpreted as a vote in favor of the reform, and m i = 0 is interpreted as a vote against the reform. The collective decision to adopt the reform is made according to a 13 Equivalently, one could assume that countries have to make repeated independent collective decisions. We assume a single decision for ease of exposition.
14 The independence assumption is ubiquitous in the literature. It emphasizes the conflict of preferences across countries that is central to the model, and it allows for a tractable framework. Note that, if arbitrary patterns of correlation are allowed, the efficient rule may not be weighted. The game thus defined is denoted by Γ E (v) if decisions are enforceable and by Γ N E (v) if decisions are not enforceable. In the game Γ E (v), a strategy for i ∈ N is a vector
and
In this article, we particularly focus on the cooperative profile of the game; i.e., the profile of strategies such that, for all i ∈ N , d i = 1, m i = 1 u i >0 and a i =v(m). The expected aggregate utility of country i associated with this profile is given by:
The main objective of the article is to identify conditions for which this cooperative profile can be implemented as an equilibrium. Section 3 tackles this question when decisions are enforceable, and Section 4 studies the non-enforceable case. Before incorporating such strategic constraints, we introduce the notions of weighted rules, vetoes, welfare, and (first-best) efficient voting rules.
Weighted Majority Rules and Vetoes
In practice, decision rules used by international committees often take the form of a weighted majority whereby each country is assigned a fixed voting weight and a reform is approved if the total weight of countries in favor exceeds a given threshold (e.g., IMF or Council of the EU before 2014). Formally, a rule v is a weighted majority rule if there exist a vector of weights w = (w i ) i∈N ∈ R N , and a threshold t ∈ [0, 1] such that, for any profile of votes
We say that rule v is weighted and can be represented by the system [w; t]. 16 Whether weighted or not, some rules mechanically grant veto power to some countries (e.g., UN Security Council). Formally, we say that a country i ∈ N has veto power under rule v if v(m) = 0 whenever m i = 0. We denote by V E(v) ⊆ N the set of countries having veto power under the rule v:
Welfare and Efficient Voting Rule
For any voting rule v, we define the welfare associated with the cooperative profile under v as:
We say that a rule is efficient if it achieves the maximum welfare at the cooperative profile;
that is, absent any incentive constraint. Following the analysis of Barberà and Jackson (2006) , it is useful to define country i's expected utility from a favorable reform, w
, and its expected disutility from an unfavorable reform, w
. From these two numbers, we define country i's stake in the decision as w Note that the definition is agnostic with respect to the tie-breaking rule. Note also that the representation of v may not be unique, even after re-scaling the weights w by a common factor.
17 Note some subtleties associated with the weight representation. First, there may be other systems of weights weight, and the threshold t e i is efficient in the sense that it is the threshold of an efficient rule if all countries have the same "efficient threshold". Note that the result focuses on first-best efficiency and that the associated cooperative profile may not be an equilibrium of the decision game. Incorporating such constraints is the main goal of our article and is the object of the following two sections. In what follows, we assume, without substantial loss of generality, that no country has veto power under the efficient rule (Assumption NEV, for no efficient veto).
3 Enforceable Decisions
We start the analysis by considering the case where decisions prescribed by the voting rule v are enforceable: each country i ∈ N commits to follow the action plan a i =v(m) for any realization of the messages m, whenever they cooperate. We are interested in voting rules that induce cooperation (in the first stage) at equilibrium. Proposition 1. The cooperative profile is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game Γ E (v) if and only if each country satisfies the participation constraint:
We denote by PC ⊆ V the set of voting rules satisfying the participation constraints.
Optimal Voting Rules
We look for voting rules maximizing social welfare when participation is voluntary. We say that a voting rule is optimal if it is a solution of the maximization problem max v∈PC W (v).
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The following theorem describes optimal voting rules. 
and where the threshold t * is the associated weighted average of countries' efficient thresholds:
At one extremity, if stand-alone utilities are low enough, all countries are willing to cooperate under the efficient voting rule. In that case, the constraints are inoperative, and the efficient rule coincides with the optimal rule. However, as stand-alone utilities become larger, the constraint starts to bind for some countries. The result asserts that, in comparison to the efficient benchmark, these countries should be overweighted, and that the threshold t * should be closer to their efficient thresholds. This is illustrated in the example of section Section 1.2, where the optimal voting rule, represented by [(3, 1, 1, 1, 1); 1/2], is such that country 1 is overweighted, while countries 2 to 5 get their efficient weight. Country 1's utility 16/3 5 is equal to its stand-alone utility, while countries 2 to 5's utility 146/3 5 is larger than their stand-alone utility 32/3 5 .
In contrast with the efficient voting weights, which can be computed independently for each country, the optimal voting weights cannot be obtained separately since they each depend on the complete probability distribution µ and on the vector of stand-alone utilities (U ∅ i ) i∈N . A country may be overweighted at the optimum if it gains relatively little from cooperation or if it often disagrees with the (efficient) collective decision (as in the example of Section 1.2).
The level of heterogeneity across countries, both in stakes and preferences, thus plays a crucial role in determining the optimal rule.
Inducing all countries to cooperate may turn out costly if some countries do not benefit enough from cooperation or if they disagree too often with the (endogenous) collective decision. Mechanically, the cost of participation, the loss of welfare from having to satisfy the participation constraints, 20 increases with each country's stand-alone utility: decreasing a country's stand-alone utility means relaxing its participation constraint, and thus improving the welfare reached at the optimal rule. However, understanding the effect of other aspects of the model (such as the probability distribution µ) on the cost of participation is more difficult 20 That is, the difference in welfare between the efficient and the optimal rules.
due to the simultaneous effect on the participation constraints and on the efficient decision rule. This ambiguous interplay may lead to counter-intuitive effects. For example, an increase in the efficiency of cooperation may actually increase the cost of cooperation. Consider, for instance, a situation where the efficient decision rule is optimal, and assume that the stake of one country increases (thus increasing the overall efficiency of cooperation). As the new efficient rule weights this country more, other countries whose (ex ante) preferences are opposite to the first country's may end up with a reduced utility. Such countries may then require some additional voting power to cooperate, thus leading to an increase in the cost of participation (from zero to positive). Similarly, an increase in the degree of preference homogeneity may actually increase the cost of participation. Again, starting from a situation where the efficient rule satisfies the participation constraints, raising the homogeneity of preferences may change the efficient voting rule, leading one country's participation constraint to be violated. 21 A more homogeneous union may thus induce a larger cost of participation.
Non-Enforceable Decisions
We have assumed so far that collective decisions were fully enforceable under cooperation.
In fact, enforceability is a major concern for most international organizations, as countries always retain some form of sovereignty and full enforceability is never really achieved. Following Maggi and Morelli (2006) , we thus relax the assumption of enforceability and consider an infinitely repeated version of our decision game where countries must repeatedly decide whether to cooperate and, if so, whether to respect the collective decision. In that framework, we show that inducing self-enforcing cooperation is more difficult than inducing cooperation under enforceability. Then, we characterize the optimal self-enforcing rule, which occasionally entails giving veto power to some countries, but not necessarily all.
Repeated Game
When decisions are not enforceable, considering the one-shot game Γ N E (v) is not sufficient, since countries have no incentive to abide by collective decisions in the fourth stage of the game if the game ends right away. A notion of self-enforcing cooperation can instead be introduced if we repeat the decision game. We thus consider the δ-discounted infinitely repeated game Γ δ N E (v). At each stage T ∈ N, each country i ∈ N decides whether to 21 Consider, for example, a union of three countries, and assume that the simple majority rule is both efficient and optimal. The probability of favoring the reform is 1/2 for country 1, q ∈ (1/2, 1) for country 2, and 1 for country 3. As q increases, the union is more homogeneous, as the probability of any two (or three) countries agreeing is either constant or increasing. However, as U 1 decreases with q (the efficient rule is independent of q, and q only affects the probability of approving the reform when 1 is unfavorable), country 1 may require to be overweighted for high q, and this leads to a positive cost of participation. For a given value of the discount factor δ, we say that a voting rule v is self-enforcing if there exists a perfect public equilibrium 22 of Γ δ N E (v) such that the cooperating profile is played at each stage of the game on the equilibrium path. To construct such an equilibrium, we consider the profile of strategies for which each country follows the cooperative strategy absent any deviation and ceases to cooperate forever after any (publicly observed) deviation by a single country i, of the form d
We observe that, under such a profile, a deviation is profitable for a country when it is unfavorable to a reform approved by the committee. In that case, a deviation yields a shortterm benefit for not complying at the current stage in addition to the stand-alone utility at the subsequent stages. Compared to the one-shot game, the repeated game thus creates an extra incentive to leave the union, which can only be mitigated by giving veto power to the country tempted to exit. To measure this new temptation to deviate, we define the maximal disutility that country i may suffer from a collective decision:
We say that a country i ∈ N satisfies the compliance constraint if
Proposition 2. A voting rule v is self-enforcing if and only if each country either has veto
power and satisfies the participation constraint, or does not have veto power and satisfies the compliance constraint.
We denote by SE the set of self-enforcing rules. The result establishes the equivalence between the notion of self-enforceability and a set of endogenous constraints. Indeed, the constraint that country i should satisfy under rule v is contingent on i having veto power under v. Moreover, we observe that the compliance constraints are more stringent than the participation constraints. As a result, if a voting rule is self-enforcing then it also satisfies the participation constraints. Note that the extreme case δ = 1 coincides with the model of enforceable decisions. 
Optimal Self-Enforcing Rules
We say that the voting rule v is optimal self-enforcing if it maximizes social welfare among selfenforcing rules; i.e., if it is a solution of max v∈SE W (v). From Proposition 2, we immediately get that social welfare is lower under an optimal self-enforcing rule than under an optimal voting rule since SE ⊆ PC. The following theorem describes optimal self-enforcing rules. 
and where the threshold t * * satisfies:
with an equality if no country has veto power, and a strict inequality otherwise.
Theorem 3 differs from Theorem 2 in two main respects. First, the benchmark level of utility U ∅ i that separates overweighted countries from non-overweighted countries is increased by an additional (1 − δ)w
23 Countries that fall strictly below this augmented utility threshold are strictly overweighted, while countries that fall strictly above receive their efficient weight. Second, in contrast to Theorem 2, the benchmark utility also separates countries that benefit from veto power from countries that do not. This is illustrated in the example of Section 1.2, where the optimal self-enforcing rule grants veto power to country 1, but not to may grant veto power to only a strict subset of countries is a major difference to Maggi and Morelli (2006) , in which either all countries have veto power or no country has veto power, and this stems from the generality of our model, which allows for heterogeneous countries.
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A Model of Apportionment
In this section, we consider a more particular model of apportionment where utilities are binary and countries differ only in their population size, which allows for more tractable results. The specification of preferences in this simplified model follows Koriyama et al. (2013) .
Model
We start by describing a more specific version of the model introduced in Section 2. Under sovereignty, each country now chooses independently which reforms to implement. In each country, for any given reform, a (randomly chosen) fraction q > 1/2 of citizens agrees with the reform. Citizens who are favorable get a utility of 1, while citizens who are unfavorable get a disutility of 1. Ex ante, the aggregate (stand-alone) utility of country i with population p i is thus equal to:
Under cooperation, proposals are determined exogenously. Ex ante, each country's representative has a probability 1/2 of agreeing with any of the proposed reforms, independently of each other. In each country, for any given reform, a fixed fraction q > 1/2 of citizens agrees with the opinion of its country's representative. If the reform ends up being implemented effectively (by all countries), favorable citizens get a utility of e, while unfavorable citizens get a disutility of e. The parameter e can be interpreted as a per-capita efficiency gain from cooperation, and we assume that e > 1. 25 If the reform is not adopted effectively, all citizens 24 Note that the possibility of having only a strict subset of veto countries at an optimal self-enforcing rule does not hinge on countries having biased preferences (as assumed in the example of Section 1.2). For example consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, µ such that P µ (u 1 = 2) = P µ (u 1 = −2) = P µ (u 2−5 = 1) = P µ (u 2−5 = −1) = 1/2, U ∅ 1 = 0.8, and U ∅ 2−5 = 0. Then for δ = 0.95, an optimal self-enforcing rule is such that a proposal is accepted (i) with probability 1 whenever country 1 and at least two of the remaining countries are in favor and (ii) with probability 0.45 whenever country 1 and one of the remaining countries are in favor. That voting rule gives country 1 veto power. 25 Note that cooperation is assumed to increase the utility from a favorable reform and the disutility from an unfavorable one, by the same factor e, consistent with the view that the collective action goes further in the desired/undesired direction. In a previous version of the article, it was assumed that the disutility of an unfavorable reform was multiplied by a factor e − , below or above 1. With that alternative (and more general) assumption, the subsequent Theorem 4 remains valid, with a suitable adaptation of the threshold of the optimal rule. get a utility of 0. The probability distribution µ associated with this model is such that:
The efficient weight of country i ∈ N is thus given by w
i /2 = (2q − 1)ep i , and its efficient threshold is t e i = 1/2. In that more specific model, countries thus vary in their stakes w e i , which are proportional to their population p i , but are otherwise identical.
26 In particular, they have the same ex-ante probability of agreeing with a given reform, equal to 1/2. Note that Assumption NEV boils down to p i < ( j∈N p j )/2 for all i ∈ N , which means that any country accounts for less than half of the total population.
Optimal Voting Rules
We now obtain sharper predictions for the optimal voting rule: first, overweighted countries are those with the smallest populations; and second, these countries must be given the same voting weight. The optimal apportionment rule is illustrated in Figure 2 , in absolute and per-capita terms.
We first note that the distribution of weights is degressively proportional : weights increase with countries' populations (left panel's curve is increasing), but less than proportionally (right panel's curve is decreasing). A sizable literature on apportionment has already argued in favor of this property, 27 but on different grounds than the one we put forth here. In particular, our argument focuses on the bottom of the distribution and supports overweighting small countries that may otherwise have almost no say in the collective decisions. By contrast, previous models recommend degressively proportional rules that have noticeable implications for medium to larger states, often with weights in the order of p α with 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1.
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The requirement that smaller countries shall be given a minimal and equal representation is actually found explicitly in the Treaty of Lisbon, which specifies a set of constraints for the composition of the European Parliament. Finally, the apportionment formula proposed here combines in a simple manner the notions of proportionality and equality, which is reminiscent of several prominent examples.
In particular, the overweighting of smaller states echoes the distribution of seats in the U.S.
Electoral College, 30 and the optimal weights per capita observed in the right panel of Figure 2 mirror the actual ones exhibited in Figure 1 . The eight smaller states are allocated the same number of three seats, 31 representing 4.5% of the seats for only 1.9% of the total population.
The same type of apportionment formula has also been proposed for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament, under the name of the Cambridge Compromise. 
Optimal Self-Enforcing Rules
We also obtain sharper predictions for the optimal self-enforcing rule: either no country has veto power or all countries have it, and we can map these two cases on a graph parametrized by the per-capita efficiency gain e and the discount factor δ.
Theorem 5. In the model of apportionment, any optimal self-enforcing rule is either the unanimity rule or a weighted majority rule for which no country has veto power. There exist a threshold e > 0, and two non-increasing functions δ c , δ ef f : R + → R + , such that 27 Laslier (2012) offers a review of the different arguments in favor of such rules. 28 For instance, in the model of Barberà and Jackson (2006) , the optimal α is approximately equal to 1/2 in the fixed-size block model, and equal to 1 in the fixed-number-of-blocks model. See also Beisbart and Bovens (2007) .
29 For a discussion of the application of the model to the allocation of seats in a federal parliament, rather than voting weights in a federal council, see Koriyama et al. (2013) .
30 Each state is allocated a baseline of two electors plus a number of electors proportional to its population. 31 Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. 32 The Cambridge Compromise was the result of an academic initiative by the European Parliament, which aimed at formulating a transparent and fair allocation of the seats in the European Parliament. The proposed allocation is based on a similar base + prop formula as in the U.S. Electoral College, whereby each country is allocated a base of six seats plus a number of seats proportional to its population. See Grimmett (2012). δ c (e) ≤ δ ef f (e) for all e ∈ R + , lim e→∞ δ ef f (e) < 1, and:
, any optimal self-enforcing rule is an efficient weighted majority rule,
(ii) if δ c (e) ≤ δ < δ ef f (e), any optimal self-enforcing rule is a weighted majority rule, with overweighting of small countries, (iii) if δ < δ c (e) and e ≥ e, the optimal self-enforcing rule is the unanimity rule, (iv) if δ < δ c (e) and e < e, there is no self-enforcing rule.
Moreover, for δ c (e) ≤ δ < δ ef f (e), there exists a minimal weight p(e, δ), non-increasing in both e and δ, such that any optimal self-enforcing rule is represented by [w * * ; 1/2], defined by:
Theorem 5 defines four regions in the space (e, δ) that yield different (or no) optimal selfenforcing rules, as represented in Figure 3 below. The figure can be interpreted either horizontally or vertically. First, the line δ = 1 depicts the results we obtain for enforceable decisions. If the per-capita efficiency gain e is too small, there is no rule inducing cooperation. If the per-capita efficiency gain e is large enough, the efficient voting rule induces cooperation and is therefore optimal. However, for intermediate values of e, the optimal rule involves overweighting small countries, and the extent to which small countries are overweighted decreases with e.
Reading Figure 3 vertically reveals how Theorem 5 extends the main result of Maggi and Morelli (2006) . In that article, countries are homogeneous, and there exists a threshold δ, below which the optimal self-enforcing rule is the unanimity, and above which the optimal self-enforcing rule is the (efficient) majority rule. In our model, for e ≥ e, there are two thresholds: δ ef f (e) and δ c (e). As in the homogeneous model, the efficient rule is the optimal self-enforcing rule when the discount factor is high (δ ≥ δ ef f (e)), and the unanimity rule is the optimal self-enforcing rule when the discount factor is low (δ < δ c (e)). What is new here is that we obtain a region of intermediate values of the discount factor (δ c (e) ≤ δ < δ ef f (e)),
for which the optimal self-enforcing rule is a weighted majority rule with overweighting of small countries. Moreover, the extent to which small countries are overweighted decreases with the per-capita efficiency gain e and with the discount factor δ.
Conclusion
We have studied the design of voting rules in representative committees when decisions are binary and cooperation is voluntary. In contrast to the efficient voting rule, which assigns to each country a voting weight proportional to its stake, the optimal voting rule sometimes involves overweighting certain countries, namely those that have the lowest endogenous incentive to cooperate. In the apportionment case, where the heterogeneity reduces to the population size and countries have identical ex-ante preferences, the optimal voting rule assigns an equal (and larger than proportional) weight to smaller countries. The theory thus provides a new rationale for the use of degressive proportional apportionment rules. When collective decisions are not enforceable, and cooperation must be agreed on repeatedly, voting rules must satisfy stronger compliance constraints, thus reducing social welfare. At the optimum, countries that do not satisfy compliance constraints benefit from veto power. In the apportionment case, the optimal self-enforcing rule is either unanimous (thus giving veto power to all countries), or such that no country enjoys veto power.
We have assumed throughout the article that cooperation was only beneficial if all countries participated, the "pure" collective action case (Maggi and Morelli, 2006) . Note that all of our results on enforceable decisions remain valid for more general forms of cooperation gains. Indeed, as participation is decided at the unanimity in our model, either all countries cooperate or all remain sovereign. Nevertheless, inducing the cooperation of all countries may prove costly, as in our main example, in which the welfare drops by 24% from the efficient to the optimal rule. When the cooperation gains are "impure", this cost may be alleviated by allowing a strict subset of countries to cooperate while the others remain sovereign. This flexible form of cooperation, known as enhanced cooperation, was first introduced by the Euro- 34 An optimal constitution could be defined as a constitution for which the welfare at a welfare-maximizing equilibrium is maximal.
35 Note that the efficient voting rule remains identical to the one in the original example since decisions are enforceable, which means either all countries or no country implements the embargo. The assumption that onlythe others remain sovereign. A constitution specifies a voting rule for each possible coalition of cooperating countries. Here, the optimal constitution is such that collective decisions are made by simple majority with a threshold of 1/3 among cooperating countries. At the associated equilibrium only countries 2 to 5 choose to participate, while country 1 remains sovereign. Countries 2 to 5 get a utility of U = 252/3 5 , while country 1 gets a utility of U = −216/3 5 , yielding the efficient level of welfare W = 792/3 5 , which is substantially larger than the welfare under the optimal voting rule, W = 648/3 5 . In contrast to the optimal voting rule under rigid cooperation, where countries 2 to 5 bear the cost of inducing country 1's cooperation, it is now country 1 that suffers from the cooperation of countries 2 to 5.
This example shows how allowing for enhanced cooperation may improve social welfare (to the point of full efficiency) if cooperation gains are not of the "pure" collective action type.
We have taken a "constrained" normative approach where a benevolent social planner looks for the welfare-maximizing voting rule while accounting for the effect of the voting rule on countries' participation and compliance. A natural alternative would be to consider a fully positive approach where countries bargain over the voting rule. The first participation stage in our game (as described in Section 2) could then be replaced by a bargaining stage where the voting rule (to be used in the subsequent stages) is determined by the following Nash program:
The rest of the game would follow in the same fashion. In contrast to the original model, the voting rule is not chosen exogenously so as to maximize social welfare but is obtained endogenously as the outcome of a Nash bargaining between countries in the initial stage. 
38 And such that the embargo is approved with probability 0.65 if all but country 1 are in favor and with probability 0.4 if only country 1 is in favor.
generally, overweighted countries under the optimal voting rule are necessarily better off under the bargained voting rule since their utility under the optimal voting rule is equal to their stand-alone utility. However, social welfare is necessarily lower since the bargained voting rule satisfies all participation constraints. Finally, note that the bargained voting rule is more difficult to compute theoretically because it is defined as the solution of a non-linear maximization problem. Wilcox, F. O. (1945 In the game Γ E (v), the only relevant beliefs are given by the prior µ at the first stage, and by µ(u i , ·) for a player i at the third stage. Thus, the only condition to check to see if the cooperating profile is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is that of sequential rationality. 
Proof of Theorem 2
In this proof, and in the subsequent proofs, we abuse notation and write v(M ) for v(m), where M ⊆ N denotes the coalition of countries that vote in favor of the proposal: M = {i ∈ N |m i = 1}.
Let V * = arg max v∈PC W (v) be the set of optimal rules. The set V * is convex: for any v, v ∈ V * and α ∈ (0, 1), it is clear that αv + (1 − α)v ∈ V * , by linearity of the objective function and of the constraints that define V * . Let v * be an optimal rule such that:
In words, the rule v * maximizes the recourse to probabilistic tie-breaking among optimal rules. We claim that, if v * is represented by [w; t], then any optimal rule v ∈ V * is also represented by [w; t] . To see that, assume that v * is represented by [w; t], but that v ∈ V * is not. Then, without loss of generality, we can assume that there exists M ⊆ N , such that i∈M w i > t i∈N w i , but v (M ) < 1. We have by assumption v * (M ) = 1. We obtain a contradiction by considering the rule v = (v
In the remainder of the proof, we solely focus on v * , as we know that any representation of v * will be a representation of any optimal rule.
We claim that v * is also a solution of the following maximization problem (note that v is not constrained to be non-decreasing in that problem) :
It suffices to show that any solution of (P) is non-decreasing. For that, let v be a solution of
It is straightforward that the rule v , obtained from v by permuting M and M , will increase the expected utility of countries in M \M , while decreasing the expected utility of no country. Hence, v improves the welfare and satisfies the constraints, a contradiction.
Let P be the probability distribution on the coalitions M of countries favoring the reform (under truthful voting), induced by the probability distribution µ. Formally:
By assumption, we have that for all M ⊆ N , P (M ) > 0. As countries' utilities are independent, the expected utility of a country i ∈ N under a rule v writes
The Lagrangian of the problem (P) writes
Its partial derivative with respect to v(M ) (one of the 2 n variables) is
As v * is a solution of (P), we can apply the first-order conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem (the constraints are affine functions). There exist non-negative coefficients (
By (i), and the formula for the derivative of the Lagrangian, we have that
Setting w * i = (1 + λ i )w e i and
we get that:
Therefore we conclude that v * , and thus any optimal rule in V * , is weighted and can be represented by [w * ; t * ]. Moreover, by application of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is divided in two steps. First, we construct a profile of the repeated game, with cooperation at each stage on the equilibrium path, and we show that it is a perfect public equilibrium if the constraints of the proposition are satisfied. Second, we show that if one constraint is not satisfied, no perfect public equilibrium can sustain cooperation on the equilibrium path.
Step 1: Let v be a voting rule that satisfies the constraints of Proposition 2. We consider the following profile of strategies:
• At each stage T , play the cooperative profile of the game Γ N E (v).
• If exactly one country is observed to deviate at time T (either d
for some i ∈ N ), then all countries choose to remain sovereign in any subsequent stage T > T .
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Consider a potential deviation from the previous profile, for some country i, and assume it is a (strict) best reply. We note (d ). Indeed, as the rule v is non-decreasing, lying only makes it more likely for the action planv(m) to go against the country's will, which is never beneficial, and it doesn't changes what happens at subsequent stages at it cannot be detected.
We may thus assume that m
N \{i} be such that µ(u i ) > 0 and a
As the deviation will be detected, it must yield a stage-payoff of more than
(because of the trigger strategies). This deviation can only be profitable if u i < 0. We then distinguish two cases:
• If i has veto power, since 1 u i >0 = 0, we havev(1 u i >0 , m −i ) = 0. Therefore, the deviation is not profitable.
• If i has no veto, we have:
because i satisfies the compliance constraint. Therefore, the deviation is not profitable.
Finally, we conclude that the proposed profile of strategies is a perfect public equilibrium.
Step 2: Now suppose that there exists i ∈ V E(v) such that U i (v) < U ∅ i . Consider a profile such that cooperation is chosen at any stage, and (v T (1 u T i >0 ) i∈N ) is always implemented. Country i's expected utility is U i (v). Therefore, playing d Moreover, we know that V * * M ⇒ v * * (M ) = 0. Now, we define w * * i = w 0 i + K1 i∈V * * , where K is defined as a sufficiently large number, for instance K = 1 + i∈N w 0 i . We obtain that if i∈M w * * i > t Finally, let i ∈ N be a country such that U i (v * * ) < U 
Proof of Theorem 4
We now have:
and U ∅ i = (2q − 1)p i . Let v * be an optimal rule maximizing the recourse to probabilistic tie-breaking (i.e. chosen as in the proof of Theorem 2, as we know that any representation of v * will be a representation of any optimal rule). We know from Theorem 2 that v * is a weighted majority rule with threshold t = 1 2 , and with weights (w i ) i∈N satisfying Note that the vector w * can be obtained from w by a finite sequence of (Pigou-Dalton) transfers of the form (w i → w i +α, w j → w j −α) with i, j ∈ S 0 and w i < w i +α ≤ w j −α < w j .
Let us show that if v * is represented by a vector [w; t], it is represented by the vector [w ; t], when w has been obtained from w by such a transfer.
Note Q = t i∈N w i = t i∈N w i and let R be a coalition such that k∈R w k > Q. We have two cases:
